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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: PLEA
COLLOQUY WARNINGS AND IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES POST-PADILLA
Vivian Chang*
INTRODUCTION
Although deportation' can sometimes represent a more serious
consequence for a non-citizen' defendant than some criminal sanc-
tions, deportation has traditionally been viewed as a purely civil
matter. This is well reflected in criminal law, where the threat of
deportation has typically been categorized as a collateral conse-
quence of criminal activity.' As a result, non-citizen defendants
were often not made aware of the possibility of deportation pursu-
ant to criminal conviction. However, in Padilla v. Kentucky the
United States Supreme Court held that deportation is unique in
that it cannot be cabined as either a direct or collateral conse-
quence; therefore, defense counsel can be found constitutionally
ineffective for not informing a client of the possibility of deporta-
tion before plea colloquy.
The holding in Padilla is significant in that it breaks from the le-
gal fiction traditionally adopted by the criminal justice system,
wherein courts distinguished between two different types of legal
consequences for criminal activity: those that are direct and those
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1. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "deportation" and "removal" should be
read to have the same meaning. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.1 (2001)
(stating that there has been a "statute-wide change in terminology" such that orders of de-
portation and exclusion are now referred to as orders of removal).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the term "non-citizen" refers to all individuals pre-
sent in the United States who have not obtained citizenship. The term non-citizen includes
both legal permanent residents as well as undocumented individuals. With the exception of
quotations from other sources, which will be left as-is, this Note will not make use of the
terms "illegal immigrant" or "illegal alien."
3. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating that removal pro-
ceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature).
4. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008).
5. Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,1486 (2010).
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that are collateral. Although the Supreme Court has never official-
ly approved of the validity of the collateral consequences doctrine,
its prior silence on the subject has not discouraged lower courts
nationwide from embracing the doctrine.
The traditional distinction is drawn as follows: the sentence and
the conviction itself are direct consequences, with everything else
being collateral." Although collateral consequences can obviously
be of the utmost importance to defendants facing criminal charg-
es, a formal distinction means that defense counsel is not
responsible for informing a defendant of these collateral conse-
quences.9 For example, defense counsel can be found to be
constitutionally ineffective for misinforming a defendant of the
possible maximum sentence,o but defense counsel will typically not
be found ineffective for failing to warn a client of the effects a con-
viction may have upon: the right to vote;" access to public benefits,
including government subsidized housing;1 employment in certain
fields;' registration as a sex-offender; 4 or the ability to obtain a
driver's license. 5
6. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 697, 704-05 (2002).
7. Id. at 706-07.
8. Collateral consequences can also be defined as those consequences that are "im-
posed by operation of law" pursuant to a conviction, as opposed to direct consequences,
which are imposed "by decision of the sentencing judge." Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment:
An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15-17 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
9. See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623,
643-44 (2006).
10. See Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15, 19 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
defendant's plea was not voluntary when counsel "grossly exaggerated the benefit to be
derived from the pleas of guilty" by overcounting the possible maximum sentence).
11. See, e.g., People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Colo. App. 2004) (rejecting de-
fendant's request to withdraw his plea because he was not advised that he would lose the
right to vote while imprisoned).
12. See, e.g., State v. Merten, 668 N.W.2d 750, 754-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting
defendant's request to withdraw his plea because he was not advised that the plea would
lead to the denial of Medicare and Medicaid benefits); see also Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.
v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (holding that local public housing authorities have the
"discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest
engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have
known about the drug-related activity").
13. See, e.g., Henry v. State, No. 207, 2003 Del. LEXIS 507, at *2, *6 (Del. Oct. 7, 2003)
(rejecting defendant's request to withdraw his plea because counsel did not "inform him of
the possible revocation of his Mortgage Loan Broker License").
14. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 86 P.3d 635, 643 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that regis-
tration as a sex offender is not a direct consequence of sentencing).
15. See, e.g., State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1998) (holding that counsel's
failure to inform defendant that a guilty plea could lead to the revocation of his license was
not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel).
WereDo We Go from Here
This Note argues for the passage of criminal procedure rules
that would require judges to warn criminal defendants about im-
migration consequences at plea colloquy. Part I addresses the
overlap of criminal and immigration law, arguing that the in-
creased use of the criminal justice system to police federal
immigration laws calls for greater protection of non-citizen de-
fendants at plea colloquy. Part II then addresses the legal duties
imposed on both defense counsel and trial courts in relation to
plea colloquy. Padilla merely addressed the duty of defense counsel
to provide constitutionally effective assistance before plea colloquy
and did not reach the question of whether a trial court's duty at
plea colloquy need be altered as well. However, in light of the Su-
preme Court's cabining of deportation as a unique consequence,
the altered legal duty of defense counsel post-Padilla necessarily
calls for a re-examination of the legal duty of trial courts as well.
This is especially true in light of the fact that a trial court's assess-
ment of the validity of a plea is conditioned on the quality of
assistance provided by defense counsel. Although Padilla does not
mandate that trial courts re-assess the language of their plea collo-
quy warnings, a changed duty on the part of defense counsel will
realistically lead to a changed duty on the part of trial courts.
Taking these considerations into account, in Part III I will thus
introduce model language for new criminal rules of procedure
that would impose a duty upon courts to inform all criminal de-
fendants of immigration consequences at plea colloquy. Standing
alone, Padilla's holding is not robust enough to safeguard the in-
terests of non-citizen defendants; the holding is deliberately
limited to clear cases involving only the adverse immigration con-
sequence of deportation. Given the vast deference afforded to
defense counsel under the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry,
a mere policing of defense counsel's duty will not actually result in
added protections for non-citizen defendants. Court instruction on
the immigration consequences of criminal activity is thus necessary
in order to: (1) secure well-informed pleas by non-citizen defend-
ants; and (2) conserve the limited resources of the criminal justice
system.
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I. OVERLAP OF CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION LAW
Although the first 100 years of American immigration law are
typically characterized as a period of virtually no restrictions,1
American immigration law has become increasingly restrictive
since Congress implemented the first racially discriminatory immi-
gration laws in the late 1800s." As the civil immigration system
continues to exercise more influence on the criminal justice sys-
tem, the need for transparent dialogue about the immigration
consequences of criminal activity becomes more critical. Given the
historical analysis of American immigration law that precedes the
holding in Padilla," an extensive survey of that history will not be
conducted in this Note; however, a brief look at the mounting con-
sequences that criminal activity has on an individual's immigration
status will be instructive.
A. History of American Immigration Law
At its inception, the American republic was not concerned with
the topic of immigration. The Constitution itself, as originally en-
acted in 1787, referenced immigration only implicitly in language
concerning slavery." Although Congress first discussed the topic of
immigration in 1798,20 an immigration law, as opposed to a law ref-
erencing the act of immigration, would not be passed until almost a
century later in 1875.2' As a sanction for non-citizens, deportation
was not conditioned on post-entry conduct until 1917," whereupon
16. This characterization is likely based on the fact that the first federal immigration
law was not passed until 1875. See infra note 17. But see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1835-40 (1993) (arguing that a lack of
federal legislation on the issue did not necessarily imply that the early stages of the Ameri-
can republic could realistically be depicted as one of completely unrestricted immigration).
17. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); Act of
March 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (policing "the immigration
of any subject of China,Japan, or any Oriental country, to the United States").
18. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478-81 (2010).
19. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con-
gress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
20. Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Enemies Act), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (cur-
rent version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)); Act Concerning Aliens (Alien Friends Act), ch.
58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798).
21. 18 Stat. 477.
22. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. Although convicts were previously
excluded from entrance in 1882, before the passage of the Act of 1917, non-citizens who
were convicted of crimes after entering the United States were not subject to exclusion or
deportation. See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1651-62
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deportation was authorized for those who committed crimes of
moral turpitude, a term left undefined by statute. Congress would
later introduce the concept of an aggravated felony, such that non-
citizens would be subject to deportation if convicted either of a
crime of moral turpitude or of an aggravated felony."
The most drastic changes in American immigration law came
next in 1996, in response to a national wave of anti-immigrant sen-
timent fueled in part by the fear of the criminal alien.2 5 The new
legislation greatly expanded the definition of aggravated felony to
the extent that certain convictions imposing sentences of just one
year or more could trigger deportation proceedings, even if the
sentence was suspended. The 1996 legislation was embodied in
two separate acts: one act restricted judicial review of immigration
21decisions, while the other completely barred review of immigra-
28
tion decisions in certain cases.
B. The Influence of Immigration Policy Upon Ciminal Law
Just as criminal law considerations have informed the applica-
tion of immigration statutes, aspects of immigration law are now
impacting the administration of the criminal justice system Given
(2009) (stating that at the turn of the century, "deportation was only used to correct admis-
sions mistakes. Deportation grounds were based on inadmissibility rather than post-entry
behavior," which in contrast to modem immigration law "seeks to regulate the post-entry
behavior of noncitizens"); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1889, 1912 (2000) ("The
modern regime of deportation for post-entry conduct began with the 1917 Immigration
Act.").
23. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
24. See 39 Stat. 874 (authorizing deportation for immigrants who committed crimes of
moral turpitude); Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102
Stat. 4181 (1988) (now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)). It should also be noted
that an aggravated felony does not have to be either 'aggravated' or a 'felony' as those terms
are typically understood in the criminal law context.
25. See Evangeline Abriel, Ending the Welcome: Changes in the United States' Treatment of
Undocumented Aliens (1986-1996), 1 RUTGERs RACE & L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1998); Stephen H. Le-
gomsky, E Pluribus Unum: Immigration, Race, and Other Deep Divides, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101, 103
(1996).
26. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 321(a) (3), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA) § 101(a) (43) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (N), (P) (1998)) (changing the
definition from including only crimes whose sentences were "at least five years" to "at least
one year").
27. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 423, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105(e)(1) (1996)) (repealed
1997).
28. IIRIRA §§ 303(a), 304(a) (3), 306(a) (2), 343, 604 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 1 U.S.C. and 8 U.S.C.).
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the increased interplay between the criminal justice system and the
immigration enforcement system in the past two decades, 9 the mu-
tually influential relationship between the two fields is hardly
surprising.
Beginning with the Immigration Act of 1917, which made crimes
30
of moral turpitude deportable offenses, the immigration en-
forcement system has looked to the criminal justice system to
determine how to proceed in certain cases. With the implementa-
tion of Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation (JRAD),
which allowed a criminal sentencing judge to recommend that a
non-citizen otherwise convicted of a deportable offense be allowed
to stay in the United States, actors in the criminal justice system
were granted a considerable amount of civil discretion in what
happened to non-citizen defendants.3 1
Prosecutors in particular have utilized this relationship between
criminal and immigration law, often to their significant advantage.
If a prosecutor is aware of a defendant's non-citizen status, he or
she is able to start off plea negotiations in a particularly powerful
position, because non-citizen defendants may be interested in serv-
ing longer sentences in order to avoid adverse immigration
consequences, or vice versa. In 1995, Attorney General Janet
Reno circulated a memo that encouraged federal prosecutors to
deliberately offer non-citizen defendants lessened sentences in re-
turn for agreements that would result in decisions more favorable
to the government in immigration courts.3
Immigration is a concern of the federal legal system; individual
states have traditionally been understood to have no power to en-
force federal immigration law. 4 However, despite the classification of
immigration as a federal matter, the federal government, under
both the second Bush administration as well as the current Obama
administration, has begun to impose federal immigration responsi-
29. See supra Part I.A (showing that post-entry conduct such as criminal activity has in-
creasingly become reason for the imposition of adverse immigration consequences).
30. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
31. See id. § 19. As a practice,JRAD was circumscribed in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), and later entirely eliminated in the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-659, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978 (1991).
32. Margaret Taylor & Ronald Wright, The Sentencing judge as Immigration judge, 51
EMORY L.J. 1131, 1160 (2002).
33. Id. ("[A] 1995 directive from the Attorney General encourages federal prosecutors
to give noncitizen defendants more favorable treatment in the criminal system, in exchange
for an agreement to concede deportability and waive procedural rights in immigration
court.").
34. See Michael Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONsr. L. 1084, 1090 (2004) ("[F]or many years the DOJ was of the view that state and local
police were not empowered to enforce civil immigration laws.").
194 [VOL. 45:1
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bilities onto local and state criminal law enforcement agencies. In
the past decade, the federal government implemented three major
programs creating formal agreements between federal immigra-
35
tion authorities and local criminal enforcement agencies.
The federal government has also begun entering immigration
information into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) .
The NCIC, which serves as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) criminal database, is accessed by local and state criminal en-
forcement agencies on a daily basis, the effect of which is that
"local police around the nation have begun to make immigration
arrests of persons encountered in routine traffic stops and other
ordinary police-civilian encounters."07
Judges, prosecutors, and the varied branches of the criminal en-
forcement system are thus aware of the impact that their actions
have in the context of immigration law. Given the increasing in-
volvement of the criminal justice system in civil immigration
proceedings, through the direct efforts of criminal justice actors or
through the commandeering of law enforcement for the benefit of
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, non-citizen defend-
ants' need for protection regarding immigration consequences
becomes all the greater. Without the enactment of substantive pro-
tections in the criminal justice system, non-citizen defendants will
increasingly find that any interactions with the criminal justice sys-
tem might put them in positions of greater vulnerability vis-a-vis
their immigration status.
II. WHAT MAKES A PLEA AGREEMENT VALID?
A criminal defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere may
be found invalid "if the trial court fails to conduct a plea colloquy
35. Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) ("The Criminal Alien
Program identifies, processes and removes criminal aliens incarcerated in federal, state and
local prisons afid jails throughout the U.S."); Criminal Alien Program, supra (click "Expand
All"); Section 287(g), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
28 7 g (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) ("The 287(g) program ... allows a state and local law en-
forcement entity to enter into a partnership with ICE . ... The state or local entity receives
delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions."); Secure Com-
munities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/lea-benefits.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (The Secure Commu-
nities Initiative works by "improving public safety every day by transforming the way criminal
aliens are identified and removed from the United States.").
36. Wishnie, supra note 34, at 1086.
37. Id. at 1087.
38. See infra Part III.C.2.
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establishing that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, or
if the plea was involuntary because it was induced by ineffective
assistance of counsel." 9 There exists a distinct legal duty on behalf
of both trial court and defense counsel to ensure the validity of a
given plea. Although the majority holding in Padilla speaks solely
40 41
to the legal duty of defense counsel,40 Justice Alito's concurrence
as well as proposed changes to state criminal procedure rules
evince an acknowledgement that Padilla may affect the duty im-
posed on trial courts as well. In analyzing the legal impact of
Padilla, it thus becomes important to understand the legal roles of
both trial court and defense counsel in the context of plea agree-
ments.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Although a cursory reading of the Sixth Amendment may not
seemingly confer criminal defendants a right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel,4 the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment as requiring just that.45 The Supreme Court later ex-
panded on this Sixth Amendment right in Strickland v. Washington,
setting out the means by which defense counsel can be determined
to have rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance." The Court
delineated a two-prong test, both prongs of which must be met for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to prevail:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
39. Chin & Holmes, supra note 6, at 727.
40. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
41. Id. at 1491 (Alito,J., concurring).
42. Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16-06-30-10.pdf.
43. Even before the Padilla holding, some resources for defense attorneys stated that
trial courts may have a duty at plea colloquy, because "[a] non-American citizen defendant
who enters a plea without understanding the immigration consequences of such a plea has
not made a knowing plea .... In the end, it's all about knowledge and informed choices."
MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRE-
SENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS XXii (2003).
44. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment only notes that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("[T]he right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
46. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Where Do We Go from Here
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair tri-
al, a trial whose result is reliable .
The first prong of the Strickland standard is rather generous to de-
fense counsel, as "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exer-
cise of reasonable professional judgment."4  Moreover, the
Strickland test is meant only to police the bare minimum perfor-
mance constitutionally required from defense counsel, and "not to
improve the quality of legal representation."
Strickland, however, involved a case in which the petitioner al-
leged ineffective assistance of counsel before and at sentencing.o
Given that the holding in Strickland was "premised in part on the
similarity between [a sentencing proceeding] and the usual crimi-
nal trial,",5 it was initially an open question whether the Strickland
standard applied to the plea process. The Supreme Court later an-
swered the question in the affirmative." However, the Court
modified the two-prong Stickland test to better suit claims arising
out of the plea process. Although the first Strickland prong re-
mained virtually the same, the second prong was adapted, such
that the question became whether "there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."5 3 Because
the Supreme Court found that the petitioner's claims did not meet
the first prong of the Strickland test, they did not attempt to "de-
termine whether there may be circumstances under which
erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel[.]",5 In the context
of pleas submitted on the basis of counsel's advice, the Supreme
Court ruled that "[i] f a prisoner pleads guilty on the advice of
47. Id. at 687.
48. Id. at 690.
49. Id. at 689.
50. See id. at 671-75.
51. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 58-59.
54. Id. at 60. However, the concurrence stated that "[t]he failure of an attorney to in-
form his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis
adopted by the majority, as such an omission cannot be said to fall within 'the wide range of
professionally competent assistance' demanded by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 62 (citation
omitted).
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counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not 'within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'"5
Although it is widely assumed that the Sixth Amendment does
not require defense counsel to inform a client about the collateral
consequences arising out of a guilty plea or a plea of nolo conten-
56dere, the Supreme Court has never directly spoken on the issue.
However, lower courts have split on the question of whether de-
fense counsel's misadvice, as opposed to a lack of advice, on the
collateral consequences of criminal activity may constitute constitu-
tionally deficient performance under Strickland.'
B. Duty of Trial Courts During Plea Colloquy
Johnson v. Zerbst introduced the notion that trial courts have a
duty to police the validity of a plea.58 Given that Johnson was decid-
ed before the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel was
affirmed in Gideon v. Wainwright," the Johnson court necessarily
found that:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in
which the accused . .. is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial
judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and
competent waiver by the accused."o
55. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
56. Chin & Holmes, supra note 6, at 706 ("The Supreme Court created the rule that
the Due Process Clause requires the trial court to explain only the direct consequences of
conviction. The extension of this principle to defense counsel's duties under the Sixth
Amendment, although never passed upon by the Supreme Court, is nevertheless among the
most widely recognized rules of American law."). Although the Supreme Court recognized
the existence of the collateral consequences doctrine in Padilla, they expressly declined to
review its continued legal validity. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) ("Wheth-
er that distinction [between direct and collateral consequences] is appropriate is a question
we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.").
57. Before Padilla, some courts have held that misadvice on immigration consequences
might trigger the first prong of the Strickland test, although non-advice would not. See Chin
& Holmes, supra note 6, at 708.
58. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938) ("If. . . the District Court finds from all
of the evidence that petitioner ... did not competently and intelligently waive his right to
counsel, it will follow that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to judgment
and conviction of petitioner. . .
59. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
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The Johnson language seemingly implied that the trial court's duty
to determine the validity of a plea only came into effect in situa-
tions where a defendant was not represented by counsel; in the
absence of the assistance of defense counsel, the trial court was
thus called upon to perform an equivalent screening function at
plea colloquy. However, after the Supreme Court affirmed the
right to appointed counsel in Gideon, the duty of trial courts to per-
form this screening function was still found applicable in the
federal system. The Court held that "a defendant is entitled to
plead anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea
without fully adhering to the procedure provided for in [Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11.,6' The Court further determined
that "Rule 11 expressly directs the district judge to inquire whether
a defendant who pleads guilty understands the nature of the
charge against him and whether he is aware of the consequences of
his plea."6 2 Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not govern state courts, the Supreme Court later held that "the
prophylactic procedures of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure]
11 are substantially applicable to the States as a matter of federal
constitutional due process."6 The duty of trial courts to determine
the validity of a proferred plea is therefore independent of defense
counsel's duty to provide constitutionally effective assistance, and
trial courts must perform this screening function whether or not a
defendant is represented by counsel.
In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court found that the Due
Process Clause requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and
64voluntary in order for it to be valid. A guilty plea is not knowing if
a defendant was not previously aware of the consequences of sub-
mitting a guilty plea, but trial courts need only explain the direct,
61. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1969).
62. Id. at 464.
63. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969). The Court also incorporated the
Johnson language, stating that "[i]t was error ... for the trial judge to accept petitioner's
guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Id. at 242.
64. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43. The voluntariness inquiry has traditionally been fo-
cused on whether a plea was "induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation . . . , or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). To the extent that this Note is not concerned by the
threat of coercion in the plea process, the analysis here will be focused on the requirement
that a plea be 'knowing.'
65. Cf Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. A guilty plea will also fail this inquiry if a defendant does
not know the nature of the charges against him or her, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
645 (1976), or if a defendant does not know the nature of the rights waived by a plea, Boykin,
395 U.S. at 243-44 (1969). However, neither of these analyses are pertinent here.
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as opposed to the collateral, consequences of conviction.r" Howev-
er, in parsing the requirement that a guilty plea must be made
knowingly, the Supreme Court has stated that the competency of
defense counsel's legal assistance is pertinent.67 Thus, the duty of
trial courts at plea colloquy is informed by the duty of defense
counsel before a defendant's submission of a guilty plea, as the lat-
ter will necessarily impact whether a plea is knowing.
C. What Padilla Changed
Before Padilla, both state and federal courts applied the collat-
eral consequence doctrine6 1 to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims." Indeed, as late as 2003, every federal circuit "to address
the question ha[d] concluded that 'deportation is a collateral con-
sequence of the criminal process and hence the failure to advise
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.',7 However,
state courts were not similarly unified in their opposition to the
Padilla proposition. Some states had recognized a Padilla-like duty
on defense counsel" and some had passed statutes imposing a duty
on trial courts to inform criminal defendants of deportation con-
71
sequences at plea colloquy.
Like the majority of state and federal courts before Padilla,
Michigan did not recognize a cognizable ineffective assistance of
66. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 ("A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences ... must stand unless induced by threats... , misrepresentation ... , or per-
haps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business . . . ."); see also United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word 'di-
rect'; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.").
67. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 755; Sambro, 454 F.2d at 922.
69. See Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 385-86 (Ky. 2005) (listing a di-
verse set of opinions which hold "that a defendant cannot as a matter of law succeed on a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his attorney failed to inform him
of the possibility of deportation following a guilty plea").
70. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing all relevant circuit
opinions at the time of the decision).
71. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) ("[W]hen defense counsel in a
criminal case is aware that his client is an alien, he may reasonably be required to investigate
relevant immigration law."); see also People v. Soriano, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1470, 1482 (1987);
People v. Padilla, 502 N.E.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Williams v. Indiana, 641
N.E.2d 44, 47-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223, 224-25
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). But see Pozo, 746 P.2d at 526 ("The trial court is required to advise the
defendant only of the direct consequences of the conviction to satisfy the due process con-
cerns that a plea be made knowingly and with full understanding of the consequences
thereof.").
72. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j (West 2011);
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 29D (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200 (2011).
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counsel claim in situations where defense counsel did not inform a
criminal defendant of the possible deportation consequences of a
guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere." In People v. Davidovich,
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld an appellate ruling that
"immigration consequences of a plea are collateral matters that do
not bear on whether the defendant's plea was knowing and volun-
tary .... [A] failure by counsel to give immigration advice does not
render the lawyer's representation constitutionally ineffective."04
The Padilla holding, of course, changes the precedent set in cas-
es like Davidovich. Although Padilla addresses only the duty of
defense counsel at plea colloquy, the Michigan Supreme Court is
now considering amendments to portions of the Michigan Court
Rules that govern the trial court's duty to determine the validity of
a submitted plea. Although members of the Michigan Supreme
Court recognize that Padilla does not mandate such an amend-
ment,76 that both of the initially proposed amendments addressed
only the role of trial courts at plea colloquy signals that such a
change may be prudent.
The recent developments in Michigan may serve as an early
glimpse into how states may come into compliance with Padilla.
Both the concurring opinion in Padilla" as well as the dissent in
Davidovich' refer to the parallel duty of trial courts at plea collo-
quy. The duty of the trial court to gauge the knowing and voluntary
nature of a plea is inherently dependent on the duty of defense
counsel to inform a criminal defendant of the consequences, given
that the trial court duty is predicated on the same language and
arises from a case where the trial court was forced to act in the ab-
sence of defense counsel.7 ' That the Michigan Supreme Court feels
compelled to consider the possibility of amending criminal proce-
dure rules to impose a duty on trial courts that is not required by
73. See People v. Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d 579, 582-83 & n.8 (Mich. 2000) (listing other
courts which "declin[ed] to find ineffective assistance of counsel where a defendant was not
informed of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea[,]" and finding no equivalent
ineffective assistance claim existed in Michigan).
74. Id. at 582.
75. Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16, 4 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16-06-30-10.pdf ("Proposal A would require a
judge to ask a noncitizen defendant and the defendant's lawyer if they have discussed possi-
ble risk of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea.... Proposal B would require a
judge to give general advice to any defendant ... that a guilty plea by a noncitizen may carry
immigration consequences.").
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
78. Davidovich, 618 N.W.2d at 584-85 (KellyJ., dissenting).
79. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Padilla points to the notion that Padilla represents a major break in
established precedent beyond its position on Strickland. If so, Padilla
will be followed by a great deal of nationwide scrutiny of the proper
roles of both defense counsel and trial courts at plea colloquy. Just as
Padilla threatens to dissolve the collateral consequences doctrine, it
also positions many jurisdictions to reconsider their criminal proce-
dure rules and the language of the Brady line of cases.
III. AMENDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES NATIONWIDE
This Note proposes a set of reforms meant to bolster those pro-
tections extended by Padilla. As previously stated in Part II, the
legal duty of trial courts at plea colloquy is affected by the legal du-
ty of defense counsel before the admission of the plea. Thus,
amending criminal procedure rules to require more robust judicial
warnings of the potential immigration consequences to criminal
conviction would serve to further the goals identified in Padilla and
provide non-citizen defendants with more meaningful protection
at plea colloquy.
I will outline the ways in which Padilla does not actually provide
non-citizen defendants with the information and means to combat
the submission of criminal pleas with devastating immigration con-
sequences. In light of that reality, I will recommend that the
federal system and all states amend their criminal procedure rules
to require trial courts to warn defendants of the potential immigra-
tion consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. I will
then address the suitability of judicial warnings as a vehicle for re-
form and present an argument in favor of the substance of the
advocated language, responding to policy concerns and appealing
to cost-benefit analyses when appropriate.
A. Wy Padilla Is Not Enough
Padilla's holding, although progressive, does not go far enough
to protect the rights of non-citizen defendants in the criminal jus-
tice system; standing alone, it may not have much of a practical
effect.80 Padilla presents three major obstacles that threaten to leave
non-citizen defendants in the same, or similar, situation as that
which came before the Court in Padilla.
80. See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn't Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393
(2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 792529.
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In examining each of these obstacles in greater detail, I will at-
tempt to show that Strickland claims are likely to grant only the
most extraordinary defendants relief from uncounseled pleas, that
the concept of a 'clear' case is illusory and open to future manipu-
lation, and that other adverse immigration consequences are
similarly situated to that of deportation.
1. The Strictness of Strickland
Padilla stands for the proposition that non-citizen defendants
may be able to present a valid Strickland claim if their defense
counsel does not adequately advise them about certain immigra-
tion consequences associated with pleading guilty. However, this
holding does nothing but state that the collateral consequences
doctrine will no longer stand as a bar to the mere raising of Strick-
land claims in such circumstances; in other words, Padilla can only
provide as much protection to defendants as Stickland does.
Ideally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be em-
ployed to police the defense bar so instances of clear
incompetence are not allowed to stand. However, Stickland created
a two-pronged test, such. that findings of both deficient perfor-
mance and prejudice are necessary." Given the presumption of
effectiveness under the first prong, along with the deference af-
forded to various tactical decisions that are more or less insulated
from appellate review, the Stickland doctrine has been widely
panned as being toothless."
Courts have declined to find ineffective assistance of counsel in
capital cases where defense counsel was drunk at trial and was se-
verely underprepared;8 3 defense counsel was asleep for the majority
of trial, citing boredom as an excuse when questioned;8 4 and de-
fense counsel was seen using a multitude of drugs during and after
trial was in session.88 These cases serve to illustrate the inability of
Strickland to give relief to defendants that suffer from even
81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1983).
82. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Un-
dermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91 (1995); Richard Klein, The
Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REv. 1433, 1445-53 (1999);
George C. Thomas III, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 543, 546-
47 (2004).
83. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But
For the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843 & n.54 (1994).
84. Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, NATION, Apr. 7, 1997, at 27.
85. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 426,
455-60 (1996).
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egregiously ineffective assistance of counsel. 6 Although in recent
years, the Supreme Court has re-invigorated Stickland by requiring
attorneys to engage in modest amounts of pre-trial investigation,
the impact of these modern holdings has mostly been found appli-
cable to capital cases only; in all other aspects, Strickland claims
remain as feeble as ever.
Because the "reasonably competent attorney" standard remains
vague and because courts have declined to adopt objective
measures of competency as identified by organizations like the
American Bar Association, findings of attorney competency are
subject to "excessive variation."" More troubling is the idea that
the low bar of competency may be determined by the representa-
tion provided by appointed counsel. In states like Michigan, where
budget concerns have lead to the evisceration of indigent defender
services," the idea that a reasonably competent attorney refers to a
reasonably competent appointed attorney leads to obvious questions
of what deficient performance means, if anything.91
Strickland further insulates incompetent performance because
"the very enterprise of after-the-fact review is doomed to failure."92
The threat of hindsight bias is especially pertinent to the Strickland
analysis, as the Supreme Court explicitly instructs appellate courts
to refrain from "intrusive post-trial inquiry" due to fears of "the
86. In all three cases, the court declined to find counsel ineffective either by way of
Strickland or United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the latter of which is meant to gov-
ern instances where ineffectiveness can be presumed under the assumption that no lawyer
could have provided effective assistance under the circumstances. See Bright, supra note 83,
at 1843 n.54; Kirchmeier, supra note 85, at 460; Shapiro, supra note 84, at 27.
87. See Robert R. Rigg, The TRex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and
the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 77, 94-98 (2007).
88. See Criminal justice Standards, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section-archive/crimjust.standardsdf
uncblk.html#1.1 (last visitedJuly 5, 2011).
89. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (MarshallJ., dissenting).
90. See Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in
Michigan and Other States?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Securi-
ty of the H. Comm. on theJudiciary, 111th Cong. 1, 11, 15, 52-53 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing].
91. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is an unfortunate but
undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to
ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available
to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited
time and resources to devote to a given case. Is a 'reasonably competent attorney' a reason-
ably competent adequately paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed
attorney?"); see also Klein, supra note 82, at 1452 ("If the norms are that counsel, due to
overwhelming caseloads, typically fail to do much of what ought to be done to provide a
competent and effective defense, then in any given case involving such failings, that coun-
sel's work would not be deemed deficient. Is this all that the Sixth Amendment now stands
for?").
92. Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective As-
sistance of Counse 2004 UTAH L. REv. 1, 2 (2004).
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distorting effects of hindsight." In the absence of any objective
benchmarks by which to evaluate an attorney's performance, this
exhortation against intrusive inquiry leads reviewing courts towards
a tendency of construing the performance as reasonable.4 The
possibility that confirmation bias will act against a defendant's in-
terests is particularly likely in the context of guilty pleas, where
often no record is made of an attorney's performance.5
Given the proven inability of Strickland to provide relief to de-
fendants, it seems unlikely that Padilla will result either in the
improvement of defense counsel in matters of immigration law or
in appellate relief for non-citizen defendants who plead in reliance
on the misadvice or non-advice of defense counsel. However, the
Supreme Court now recognizes the notion that certain immigra-
tion consequences are important enough to affect the validity of
submitted pleas. Although Padilla may not provide a robust remedy
for non-citizen defendants, it nevertheless opens the door for con-
sideration of other means of protecting these rights.
2. What Constitutes a 'Clear' Case?
Padilla's holding was deliberately limited to those "truly clear
cases" in which a reading of the relevant statute or penal code
would put defense counsel on notice of the possibility of deporta-
tion pursuant to a plea." However, the determination of whether a
case is clear or not will mostly depend on an individual attorney's
familiarity with immigration law.
The Supreme Court labors under the notion that law school and
continuing legal education requirements equip criminal attorneys
with all the training they might need. But criminal procedure is
not a required course at most law schools, and it is well-
documented that some criminal attorneys are woefully underedu-
cated on matters pertaining to their everyday practice.98
93. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
94. Bibas, supra note 92, at 5-6 ("Deference and the presumption of effectiveness turn
flexible review into almost no review at all, as courts can find some rationale for almost any
behavior. When courts start out presuming that attorney actions are tactics rather than er-
rors, the confirmatory bias leads them to interpret almost any action as tactical.").
95. Id. at 4-5.
96. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
97. SeeConnick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361-62 (2011).
98. See id. at 1385-86 (Cinsburg,J., dissenting) ("Whittaker told the jury he did not re-
call covering Brady in his criminal procedure class in law school .... One can qualify for
admission to the profession with no showing of even passing knowledge of criminal law and
procedure.").
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How, then, can it be expected that defense attorneys will have
any familiarity with the particularized language of immigration
statutes? A proficient immigration lawyer would find the threat of
deportation to be clear in situations where a defendant is being
charged with a crime of moral turpitude that is committed within
five years of the defendant's date of admission, and for which a
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.99 Although an
immigration lawyer would be familiar with the elements that con-
stitute a crime of moral turpitude, it is not clear that a criminal
defense attorney would understand what crimes are covered under
that classification. It is also unclear whether criminal defense at-
torneys would think to ask for immigration-specific information,
like their client's date of admission.
By whose standard is the clearness of a case meant to be judged?
Even if it is presumed that the Supreme Court meant to have
clearness evaluated by a criminal defense attorney's perspective,
the ambiguous standard of Strickland means that we have no means
by which to judge how familiar a reasonably competent defense
attorney is with immigration law. Although the Supreme Court
meant to restrict the universe of cases in which a valid Padilla claim
might be had, in assessing cases by the clearness of immigration
consequences, the Supreme Court has instead only muddied the
waters.
3. Deportation and Other Immigration Consequences
In refusing to speak on the continued relevance of the collateral
consequences doctrine, and in identifying deportation as neither
direct nor collateral in nature, the Padilla Court explicitly limits its
holding to cases involving the threat of deportation. After a long
examination of the history of immigration law, the Padilla Court
concludes that deportation is a consequence of such significance
that it must be taken into consideration in a defendant's plea cal-
culus."'0 Undoubtedly, this is true for most, if not all non-citizen
defendants. However, the majority in Padilla did not consider the
impact that other adverse immigration consequences might have
on non-citizen defendants. 0' In choosing not to address this issue,
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (2006).
100. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
101. The majority did find that, "[w] hen the law is not succinct and straightforward .. a
criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending crim-
inal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
It is unclear whether there is a duty on defense counsel to warn against the full panoply of
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non-citizen defendants whose pleas leave them vulnerable to ad-
verse immigration consequences other than deportation are
therefore left without any legal recourse.xo2
It is evident that the imposition of other adverse immigration
consequences follows just as clearly from the submission of a plea
as did deportation in Padilla. For example, if a non-citizen defend-
ant pleads guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude, the
defendant is inadmissible;103 if a non-citizen defendant pleads guilty
to an aggravated felony committed within five years of admission,
they are permanently barred from becoming naturalized. 10 4
It is also unclear whether deportation is so unique as to defy
comparison to other adverse immigration consequences. If a legal
permanent resident is found to be inadmissible pursuant to a guilty
plea, they are not automatically deported from the country.'05
However, if they leave the country for any reason, they will later be
denied entrance if they attempt to return.1'0 In situations where
defendants must travel abroad for work or because of a personal
emergency, a finding of inadmissibility might then be tantamount
to deportation.
If a non-citizen is deported or denied entrance to the United
States, they must wait for a number of years before they can legal-
ly re-enter.0 7 In contrast, pleading to an aggravated felony might
stand as a lifetime bar to naturalization; 8 even if denial of natu-
ralization is found to be different in kind from either deportation
or inadmissibility, the complete revocation of the possibility to
naturalize would speak to the weight that this sanction would have
on a non-citizen defendant's decision to plead.
B. judicial Warnings
If the criminal justice system is to concern itself with the interest
of non-citizen defendants at plea colloquy, it would be prudent for
adverse immigration consequences, given the majority's exclusive use of the word "deporta-
tion" in its holding.
102. See id. at 1491 (Alito,J., concurring).
103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). However, there are two caveats: first,
there is a petty offense exception, id. § 1182(a) (2) (A) (ii); and second, the defendant may
yet qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility, id. § 1182(h).
104. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (3) (2006) (requiring a showing of "good moral character"
as a prerequisite to naturalization).
105. See ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE CRIMINAL LAW-
YER'S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS § 4.14, at 111 (2d ed. 2006).
106. See id.
107. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (A)(i) (2006).
108. See id. § 1427(a) (3).
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courts to begin issuing immigration warnings to non-citizen de-
fendants at plea colloquy. Judicial warnings are not mandated by
the Padilla holding; however, giving the indulgent nature of the
Strickland doctrine, judicial warnings may be the only way to pro-
tect non-citizen defendants from making completely uncounseled
decisions.
1. Proposed Reform
This Note's proposed reform was initially drafted to mirror the
Michigan Court Rules,"0 ' but the substantive portions of the reform
can easily be adapted to correspond to the criminal procedure
rules of other jurisdictions. Because each state has the freedom to
adopt and further modify its own criminal procedure rules,o the
rules governing the admission of pleas for each state will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For the sake of simplicity, this Note's
reform will be worded generally, so as to allow compatibility with
any system.
The reform proposed here would amend criminal procedure
rules that govern the admission of pleas of guilty or nolo conten-
dere. Amendments would generally read as follows:
Speaking directly to the defendant or defendants, the court
must advise the defendant or defendants of the following and
determine that each defendant understands that a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere by a non-citizen may result in re-
moval, denial of admission to the United States, denial of
naturalization, or an otherwise adverse change in legal status
under the laws of the United States. Either upon request or
according to the discretion of the court, the court shall allow
the defendant or defendants a reasonable amount of time to
consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of the ad-
visement.
109. See generally MICH. CT. R. 6.302 (stating Michigan criminal procedure rule govern-
ing plea colloquy).
110. Despite this freedom, "[r]oughly half of the states have court rules of criminal pro-
cedure or statutory codes of criminal procedure that borrow heavily from the Federal
Rules." Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Modelfor the States, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. ScI. 130, 138 (1996). Although "the one source most frequently emulated is the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[,]" other common models of criminal procedure are
the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure and the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standard for Criminal Justice. Id. at 137-38.
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Where possible, I would advise that the generic warning above be
tailored to the individual charges that form the basis of the plea
agreement. Trial courts normally will not be privy to the exact na-
ture of plea agreements, but at least in circumstances where the
pled-to charges are known by the court to carry specific immigra-
tion consequences, warnings that name the specific consequences
attached to the charges in the plea agreement would be more ap-
propriate than the general warning given above.
In cases that allege a failure to warn, the burden of proof would
be on the government to provide documentation otherwise. The
appropriate remedy would be to allow defendants to retract their
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.
2. Why Judicial Warnings?
In his Padilla concurrence, Justice Alito identified judicial warn-
ings as a potential vehicle for ensuring that non-citizen defendants
plead in full knowledge of the possibility of deportation.' Many
states currently require judges to give some form of judicial warn-
ing as to immigration consequences during plea colloquy"' and at
least one state is now considering the possibility of implementing
similar warnings in light of the Padilla decision. 13
Because there exists a concurrent duty on defense counsel and
trial courts to ensure the validity of a defendant's plea, it seems em-
inently rational to employ judicial warnings in a post-Padilla world.
Although the duty on defense counsel to provide effective assis-
tance is not interchangeable with the duty on the trial court to
police the knowing and intelligent nature of a plea, they both serve
to safeguard similar interests. Judicial warnings cannot serve as a
substitute for the effective assistance of counsel, but their imple-
mentation can rectify many of the weaknesses that plague the
stand-alone Padilla holding."
Given the trend of Sthickland over the past decades, it seems clear
that Padilla's holding will do little to improve the representation
that non-citizen defendants are afforded in the criminal justice sys-
tem. If we mean to craft an actual standard by which non-citizen
defendants are afforded some protection from pleading in
111. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
112. See id.
113. Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16, 4 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16-06-30-10.pdf.
114. See supra Part III.A.
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ignorance of immigration consequences, it makes more sense to
pin the burden of responsibility on courts. Judges, who can avail
themselves of the court's resources and who are ostensibly more
familiar with the various branches of civil law, are inherently better
positioned to instruct defendants on aspects of immigration law.
This is a function that judges served quite ably until recently. For
many decades, judges were allowed to submit motions pursuant to
criminal sentencing that would prevent the deportation of a non-
citizen defendant.115 Although Congress elected to remove this sort
ofjudicial discretion from the deportation calculus, judges should
still be proficient at applying immigration law in a criminal con-
text.
Moreover, it is important to recall that the Supreme Court re-
manded the Padilla case for a finding on the prejudice prong of
the Strickland test. Hill v. Lockhart stands for the proposition that
Padilla might not be able to meet the prejudice prong standard.117
The question is not just about whether Padilla would have pled
guilty, in full knowledge of the possibility of deportation; the re-
viewing court must also take into account "predictions of the
outcome at a possible trial," such that Padilla may have to show
that he would not have been convicted of the crime at trial.118
Proponents of defendants' rights should note that this counsels
heavily in favor of judicial warnings, as opposed to the Strickland
remedy fashioned by the Padilla Court. Imagine a non-citizen de-
fendant charged of a crime for which deportation is mandated. If
that defendant is not warned of the immigration consequences of
his plea, there may still be no relief under Padilla if the reviewing
court determines that the defendant would have lost at trial. How-
ever, if that defendant is warned of such consequences before a
plea is entered, the defendant will be able to opt into trial and take
a chance on winning an acquittal. Although courts frown upon the
idea of viewing verdicts as products of chance, the reality is that
they are. Given the choice, non-citizen defendants would likely
prefer to risk their chances at trial than have a reviewing court
summarily adjudge that their legal case was not strong enough to
merit Strickland relief.
Appellate review of failure-to-warn claims would also provide a
more workable standard for courts to apply and be more protective
of a non-citizen defendants' interests. Failure-to-warn claims are
115. See supra Part I.B. (discussingJudicial Recommendations Against Deportation).
116. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
117. See 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985) (holding that defendant must still show that "there is
a reasonable probability" that the he "would have insisted on going to trial").
118. Id.at59-60.
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inherently less complex than Strickland claims; an appellate court
need only determine, based on the plea colloquy record, whether a
defendant received the necessary warning. The presence of an ob-
jective standard means that failure-to-warn claims are less
vulnerable to various psychological biases and the inevitable error
introduced by the elaborate hypothetical reasoning required by
the Strickland test. Because such claims are easier to implement in
the first instance and because a failure-to-warn is easier to remedy
on appeal, non-citizen defendants will be able to gain access to vital
information about immigration consequences in a more uniform
manner.
Moreover, if judicial warnings are implemented, judges may be-
come more open to the possibility of authorizing defense counsel
to use court fees to retain immigration attorneys. Although judicial
warnings alone may not allow non-citizen defendants ample time
to consider their plea in light of new information, the notice that
such warnings have on defense counsel may serve to facilitate timely
counsel-client conversations about immigration consequences.'
The proposed judicial warnings are also meant to be relatively
exhaustive; because they are not restricted only to clear cases in-
volving deportation, they will provide more protection for a larger
class of defendants. Besides being more defendant-friendly, the
proposed judicial warnings will also promote uniform implementa-
tion and ease of adjudication at the appellate level. Because the
proposed reform does not differentiate based on the clearness of
the case or the type of immigration consequence, courts will know
exactly when warnings are required and when a failure to warn
merits a withdrawal of a plea.
Judicial warnings have already been shown to be easily imple-
mented. Even before the Court announced the Padilla holding,
several states required similar judicial warnings to be given at plea
colloquy.2 o In California, for example, warnings about immigration
consequences have been in place since 1985."' One need only look
at the example set by similarly situated states to determine that ju-
dicial warnings are a workable solution.
119. See Pinard, supra note 9, at 678 ("The relative lack of lawyer focus on these compo-
nents may well correlate to the lack of attention that trial courts have afforded these
components . . . .").
120. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito,J., concurring).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 1985).
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C. Counter-Arguments
In light of Padilla, some states are now considering amending
their criminal procedure rules to include judicial warnings of the
immigration consequences of entering a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere. In particular, the Michigan Supreme Court's call for
amendments to the state's court rules has resulted in a number of
responses from various sectors of the Michigan bar. Some of the
criticisms lodged against the proposals in Michigan are also rele-
vant to the reform suggested by this Note; I will thus rely in part on
the debate in Michigan to discuss why such a reform is necessary.
1. Adverse Immigration Consequences
Padilla concerned merely the threat of deportation; even if aju-
dicial warning is to be implemented alongside Padilla, why should
such a warning inform non-citizen defendants about adverse im-
migration consequences other than deportation? A more focused
judicial warning would tend to be more successful at actually put-
ting defendants on notice. Given these concerns, why should
proposed reforms include language that warns about the "removal,
denial of admission to the United States, denial of naturalization,
or an otherwise adverse change in legal status under the laws of the
United States"?22
Critics of broad judicial warnings argue that they should "limit[]
the inquiry specifically to the deportation consequences of a guilty
plea, which was the only issue before the Court in Padilla, rather
than expanding this inquiry to encompass other collateral matters
. . . ." 10Although the majority in Padilla held only that "counsel
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deporta-
tion,"2 4 the majority opinion also held that in ambiguous cases, a
defense attorney "need do no more than advise a noncitizen client
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigra-
tion consequences." 25 Here, the implication is that the lynchpin of
Padilla's holding turns on the clearness that an adverse immigration
consequence would be imposed, instead of the type of adverse im-
migration consequence imposed.
122. See supra Part III.B.1 (quoting language from this Note's proposed reform).
123. Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16, 4 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16-06-30-1O.pdf.
124. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
125. Id. at 1483.
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It may be argued that this language merely implies that warning
of adverse immigration consequences is only required in ambiguous
cases to the extent that it serves as a proxy to warn about
deportation specifically.'2 ' However, that reading of the Court's
language creates an oddly over-inclusive program; if the Court is
concerned with deportation to the exclusion of all other
immigration consequences, they would ostensibly only ask defense
attorneys to advise clients that pending criminal charges may carry
a risk of deportation. That the Court relies so heavily on the word
deportation' 7 in their holding signifies only that they meant to
refer to consequences other than deportation when using the
phrase "adverse immigration consequences."
If defense attorneys have a duty to give clients general advice on
the immigration consequences of pleading, then judicial warnings
should similarly be required to warn defendants about a broader
set of immigration consequences.
2. Non-Citizen Defendants Only?
The intent is that the proposed judicial warning will be read to
all defendants, regardless of their legal status. Some may criticize
this approach as being overbroad, preferring any such warnings
to instead be targeted to non-citizen defendants.'28 However, re-
stricting warnings to non-citizen defendants could result in four
major drawbacks: (1) it could encourage racial profiling, (2) it
could interfere with attorney-client privilege, (3) it could expose
non-citizen defendants to greater vulnerability, and (4) differen-
tiating between citizen and non-citizen could result in an
impracticable standard.
We must first ask how such a standard would be applied in prac-
tice; how would courts actually determine which defendants are
non-citizens? It seems possible, if not necessarily inevitable, that
such language would direct judges to engage in blatant racial pro-
filing during plea colloquy. Although in limited circumstances,
racial profiling has been deemed to have satisfied the rational basis
126. See Comment of Timothy A. Baughman, Wayne Cnty. Office of the Prosecuting At-
torney, to Corbin Davis, Clerk, Mich. Supreme Court 2 (Sept. 15, 2010) (commenting on
ADM 2010-16, the Proposed Amendments of MICH. CT. R. 6.302 and 6.610).
127. Id. at 1-2.
128. See Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16, 4 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16.06-30-10.pdf. To the extent that fears
about the costs inherent in such warnings are merely red herrings, they will be addressed in
greater detail in Part III.C.5 of this Note.
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standard in immigration cases, racial profiling has been more
limited in the criminal context." Because plea colloquy is gov-
erned by the rules of criminal procedure, the importation of such
racial profiling to the criminal context might be prone to legal
attack.
Racial profiling would also be both an over- and under-
inclusive means of warning non-citizens of immigration conse-
quences. Racial profiling in the immigration context often leads to
an intense focus on those of perceived Latino descent;' judges
would likely base their determinations of citizenship at least partially
on whether a defendant appeared to be Latino. This would be
over-inclusive inasmuch as not all Latinos are non-citizens, and
under-inclusive because such warnings would not be given to non-
citizens of other races. Here, the fear of under-inclusive warnings is
especially profound, given that the purpose of amending plea collo-
quy rules is to allow non-citizen defendants to make a knowing and
intelligent plea before any adverse immigration consequences
attach.
If warnings are directed only to non-citizen defendants, and if
such warnings avoid the pitfalls of racial profiling, courts will then
be forced to inquire about a defendant's legal status at plea collo-
quy."' However, asking either a defense attorney or a defendant
about the defendant's legal status would be extremely inadvisable.
If non-citizen defendants state their legal status on the record in
a court proceeding, they may run the risk of leaving themselves
open to greater vulnerability in future immigration proceedings. A
defendant need not plead to, or be convicted of, a criminal offense
in order to be open to adverse immigration consequences; "[t] he
law states that a person who 'admits the essential elements' of a
crime involving moral turpitude even though he or she does not
129. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (holding
that "the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor" in conducting an immigration stop).
130. See Terry Freiden, Ashcroft Tells Caucus He's Committed to Ending Racial Profiling, CNN
POLITIcs (Feb. 28, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-02-28/politics/ashcroft.profiling_
1_judge-ronnie-white-ashcroft-presidential-vote?_s=PMALLPOLITICS (noting Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft's intention to "'determine the extent and nature of racial profiling"' in the
criminal context, and to "take steps to end the practice of police stopping individuals based on
their race").
131. See Mary Romero & Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights ResultingFrom INS
and Local Police's Use of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in
Arizona, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 75,85 (2005).
132. A defendant's legal status is sometimes included in their presentencing investiga-
tion report. However, such information may not be gathered in every case or made available
to the court before sentencing because legal status is not an element of any state criminal
offense.
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have a final conviction is inadmissible."3 3 Non-citizen defendants
are thus deterred from answering questions about their legal status
in a full and complete fashion. 34 But if a defendant refuses to an-
swer such a question honestly, why should the court not consider
its duty discharged? Actors in the criminal justice system should
not attempt to expose a certain class of defendants to greater legal
risks in proceedings that do not concern the underlying criminal
charge. Padilla acknowledges the importance that certain immigra-
tion consequences may have on a defendant's decision to plead
guilty; it would thus be absurd to supplement the protections of
that ruling by asking courts to put defendants to a "Sophie's
Choice" of remaining uninformed or identifying themselves to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Courts should also refrain from asking defense counsel about
their client's legal status. Conversations between defense counsel
and defendant about a client's legal status are protected by attor-
ney-client privilege and should not be disclosed;1" "Due process
concerns should outweigh the court's or prosecutor's need for
court efficiency in a curtly-worded amendment."36
Because it would be inappropriate for the court to ask either a
defendant or defense attorney to divulge the defendant's legal sta-
tus, and because the court would have no other means by which to
determine a defendant's legal status in a legally appropriate man-
ner, judicial warnings should be given to all defendants. Asking
courts to make these determinations would "place[] an unneces-
sary burden on judicial decision-making and resources, by
requiring the trial court to make a citizenship determination of
every criminal defendant."'3 Given the complexities of citizenship
determination, which often extend beyond the simple question of
birthplace,' the cost-benefit analysis obviously runs in favor of ex-
tending judicial warnings to all defendants.
133. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 112 (2003).
134. See Comment of Aaron W. Todd, Chief Counsel of the Mich. and Ohio Office of
the Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Corbin R. Davis, Clerk, Michigan Supreme Court 1 (Sept.
21,2010) (commenting on the Proposed Amendments of MICH. CT. R. 6.302 and 6.610).
135. See Comment of Cynthia M. Nufiez, Walker & Assoc.'s of Mich., P.C., to Corbin R.
Davis, Clerk, Mich. Supreme Court 3 (Sept. 30, 2010) (commenting on Proposed Amend-
ments of MICH. CT. R. 6.302 and 6.610); Todd, supra note 134, at 1.
136. See Nufiez, supra note 135, at 3.
137. Todd, supra note 134, at 2.
138. Citizenship may "depend on whether [a defendant] derived or acquired citizen-
ship based upon their parents' (or grandparents') activities decades prior." Id. at 1; see also
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (holding that a federal statute, which imposed differ-
ent requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen
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3. Notice
Another concern is that defendants do not currently pay atten-
tion to the rote nature of warnings at plea colloquy, and that non-
citizen defendants therefore would not actually be put on notice of
the immigration consequences they might face. Inasmuch as the
criticism against the routine itself is valid, it applies to the entirety of
judicial warnings at plea colloquy as well as other stock warnings
like Miranda warnings. However, our legal system operates under
the belief that both judicial warnings and Miranda warnings cure
the harms they are designed to prevent. Society at large certainly
has contributed to individual understanding of the rights afforded
to everyone in the criminal justice system, perhaps more so than
individual courts or police officers; but regardless of the source of
such knowledge, there must be a basis in the law that afford indi-
viduals protection before dissemination of knowledge becomes
meaningful.
Even if judicial warnings may not immediately put non-citizen
defendants on notice about the possibility of adverse immigration
consequences, their inclusion will certainly act to put defense
counsel on notice. The real benefit of judicial warnings may lie in
signaling to defense counsel that they should inquire about a cli-
ent's legal status and attempt to engage in conversation about the
possibility of immigration consequences. Padilla, by itself, will not
force the hand of most defense attorneys who are well aware that
most Strickland claims are futile. However, if language about immi-
gration consequences is regularly injected into the plea colloquy
process, defense attorneys will increasingly be reminded that im-
migration consequences are too important to ignore.
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Because Padilla focuses on the role of defense counsel, critics
argue that amending criminal procedure rules to include judicial
warnings would be unnecessarily costly and time-consuming.1"
However, given the routine nature ofjudicial warnings, it is unclear
how the inclusion of a warning on adverse immigration conse-
quences might entail more than a negligible increase in time or
parent was the child's mother or father, is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment).
139. See Proposed Amendments of Rules 6.302 and 6.610 of the Michigan Court Rules,
ADM File No. 2010-16, 4 (Jun. 30, 2010), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/resources/administrative/2010-16-06-30-10.pdf.
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resources. 4 o Certainly several states nationwide have implemented
such warnings before Padilla without being burdened with over-
whelming systemic costs. 4 ' This is especially true for states like
California,'4 who have maintained immigration warnings for dec-
ades despite having a non-citizen population that far outstrips that
of states like Michigan. 43
That states with large non-citizen populations tend to incorpo-
rate such warnings into their criminal procedure rules tends to
demonstrate that such judicial warnings may actually represent a
net savings.14 4 Padilla's holding would allow an entire class of de-
fendants to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Even if
they are not granted, as most Strickland claims are not, these claims
would still represent a significant cost in terms of time and mon-
ey.'45 However, the inclusion of judicial warnings at plea colloquy
could convert Padilla claims to instances of harmless error; this
could serve to both discourage the filing of Padilla claim in the first
instance, or to make appellate rulings less complicated. Some
states have held that a failure to warn does not undermine a valid
Padilla claim, or convert it to instances of harmless error. But in
Florida, at least, the key distinction was that the judicial warning
was worded with the permissive 'may."4 ' However, the reform posed
by this Note allows for adjustments according to the pled-to of-
fensel47; in situations where the threat of deportation is sufficiently
clear, ajudge should edit the language accordingly.
140. Comment of Criminal Def. Attorneys of Mich., to Corbin Davis, Clerk, Mich. Su-
preme Court 2 (Sept. 30, 2010) ("This routine statement during plea colloquy does not
appear to appreciably waste time or resources and facilitates a knowing, understanding and
voluntary plea.").
141. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring) (stating
that twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted rules that require some
sort ofjudicial warning of immigration consequences).
142. SeeCAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 2011).
143. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIVITY STATUS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES:
2009, 5 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbrO9-16.pdf (stating
that California has a non-citizen population of 14.6%, with an overall state population of
36,962,000, whereas Michigan has a non-citizen population of 3.2%, with an overall state
population of 9,970,000).
144. See id.; ARIz. R. CRIM. PROC. 17.2(f) (West 2011); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.1 7 2(c)(8)
(West 2011); N.M. R. CRIM. PROc. 5-303(F)(5) (West 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
Art. 26.13(a) (4) (West 2011).
145. Hearing, supra note 90, at 118-23 (written testimony of Dawn Van Hoek, Chief
Deputy Director, Michigan's State Appellate Defender Office).
146. Flores v. Florida, 57 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
147. See supra Part III.B.1 ("Where possible, I would advise that the generic warning
above be tailored to the individual charges that form the basis of the plea agreement.").
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CONCLUSION
The Padilla opinion is undoubtedly one of the most important
criminal procedure cases handed down in recent history because
of its potential impacts on the collateral consequences doctrine.
Although the contours of what Padilla means have not yet been
determined, the opinion implies that at least one 'collateral' civil
consequence will have direct bearing in the context of criminal
law. As lower courts debate the scope of Padilla's holding, it is clear
that the unique circumstances of indigent defense nationwide
mandate a change in criminal procedure at plea colloquy.
The holding of Padilla did not suggest a functional remedy to
the problem posed to non-citizen defendants at plea colloquy, par-
ticularly those who have appointed counsel. Although Padilla does
not mandate the implementation of judicial warnings, their im-
plementation could help address many of the open questions left
in the wake of the Padilla holding. Judicial warnings, although not
a cure-all, would be better suited to inform and protect all non-
citizen defendants of their rights. This reform could also serve to
make implementation of Padilla more feasible in state courts across
the country. Until a time comes when Strickland has been scrapped
and reworked into a more feasible standard, judicial warnings rep-
resent the best compromise that our criminal justice system can
offer.
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